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Schengen Area Shaken: The Impact of Immigration-Related Threat Perceptions on the 
European Security Community 
Tal Dingott Alkopher 
Emmanuelle Blanc 
 
In light of the recent European refugee crisis, the article uses the concept of security community (SC), in order to 
explore the destabilizing impact of immigration-related threat perceptions on the Schengen Area. Theoretically, it 
is nourished by the will to support efforts by security community researchers to explore the challenges besetting 
security communities rather than just tracing their evolution. Viewed from a constructivist prism, the article 
describes how through a complex social process, immigration-related threat perceptions can trigger a security 
dilemma dynamic among SC states, undermining the SC's basic trust and common identity, and encouraging states 
to abandon cooperative norms for unilateral defensive practices. Empirically; we show how immigration-related 
threat perceptions are working against the Schengen regime by examining well-established evaluation indicators 
in the SC literature. Finally, two avenues for future research are suggested in considering how to surmount the 
negative dynamics: the first draws on existing desecuritization literature, the second builds on existing SC 
literature addressing the rehabilitation of collective identities and trust among an SC's members in times of crisis. 




The year 2015 may be remembered as the year Europe had to deal with the greatest movement 
of people fleeing conflict, since the end of Second World War. This unprecedented migratory 
pressure on the doorstep of Europe has triggered a fierce public debate around the possible 
demise of one of the major achievements of European integration, namely the Schengen Area. 
In light of these events, the article uses the concept of security community (SC), in order to 
explore the destabilizing impact of immigration-related threat perceptions on the Schengen 
Area. Theoretically, it is nourished by the will to support efforts by security community 
researchers to explore the challenges besetting security communities rather than just tracing 
their evolution, using the Schengen Area as a case study.  
Viewed from a constructivist prism, the article describes a causal mechanism that 
destabilizes SCs following immigration-related threat perceptions. Through a complex social 
process, immigration-related threat perceptions can trigger a security dilemma dynamic among 
SC states, undermining the SC's basic trust and common identity, and encouraging states to 
abandon cooperative norms for unilateral defensive practices. Examination of well-established 
evaluation indicators in the SC literature reveals how immigration-related threat perceptions 
undermine SCs. These indicators include: multilateralism, unfortified borders, community 
discourse, 'we-feeling' language, but also integration level, policy coordination against 
‘internal’ threats, free movement of SC populations, and internationalization of authority and 
rule. The article therefore shows that although immigration-related threat perceptions do not 
actually affect the absence of preparation for armed conflict as a characteristic of SCs, they do 
challenge other significant SC features, such as intersubjective understandings as well as 
overlapping and concentric inter-states practices, and thus deserve our attention.1 
We illustrate our argument with a case study of an 'uncontested' SC, namely Europe 
(Adler and Barnett 1998, 16; Booth and Wheeler 2008, 3, 190-191; Bremberg 2015; Weaver 
1998). Specifically, we demonstrate how immigration-related threat perceptions have 
destabilized the Schengen Area as a security community. We are well aware of the fact that the 
Schengen Area is embedded within other supranational and inter-governmental frameworks of 
cooperation between European states in the field of security and other political dimensions. Our 
decision to focus on Schengen is nourished by both methodological and empirical 
considerations. Methodologically, we believe that focusing on Schengen serves as a laser-like 
tool to better illustrate our theoretical insights. Furthermore, Schengen constitutes an ideal 
illustration of the abstract conceptualization of a SC because of its materialist characteristics 
(i.e. clearly defined area of highly integrated sovereign states enjoying free movement and 
unfortified borders) and ideational features (i.e. attachment to the European idea, sense of 
common identity, and mutual trust).  
The article then contributes to two main bodies of literature: the theoretical literature on 
security communities and the empirical literature on the Schengen regime. Regarding the first, 
we note that IR interest in SCs was aroused by the puzzling cooperative behaviour of states and 
the existence of 'communities' in an anarchical system. Consequently, most research has 
focused theoretically and empirically on SC evolution, as in the North Atlantic Area, Europe, 
Euro-Med Area, South East Asia, South America, US-Mexican relations, the Arab Gulf States, 
and even NATO-Russia (Acharya 2001; Adler and Barnett 1998; Bellamy 2004; Bremberg 
2015; Collins 2007; Deutsch 1957; Pouliot 2007, 2011).  
More recently, SC researchers have investigated SC challenges rather than simply 
analysing their evolution. Several studies have examined the potential for severe disruption in 
SC functioning due to 'identity crisis'; uncertainty (Bially-Mattern 2005; Kitchen 2009); 
perceived incompatible values2, and violation of one member's habitus by another (Bjola and 
Kornprobst 2007). Domestic violence has also been pointed out as a factor hampering SC 
formation, as illustrated by intra-state instability in Africa (Nathan 2006).  Finally, Adler and 
Greve (2009) showed that SCs are complex, multi-perspective security governance systems that 
can overlap with other security governance systems such as the balance of power that can limit 
or even challenge the SC. 
The article pursues this thinking by focusing on the destabilizing impact of immigration-
related threat perceptions on SCs. Even though our theoretical framework draws upon a few 
elements developed in the above literature (in terms of identity crisis and the damage to habitual 
practices), it clearly departs from previous researches by developing a specific mechanism 
destabilizing the SC, and by focusing on immigration-related threat perceptions as the variable 
causing the crisis within the SC. Furthermore, while the studies mentioned above reckons with 
the ‘solving’ mechanism of the crisis, we leave this aspect to future research and focus on the 
destabilizing mechanism itself.    
The destabilizing impact of immigration-related threat perceptions has inadequately 
been addressed, possibly due to the taken-for-granted assumption that a perceived threat from 
immigration strengthens SCs—either at the common identity narrative level or at the practical 
level of increased multilateral and cooperative measures against the perceived threat (Adler and 
Barnett 1998: 57; Bremberg 2015; RUDOLF 2006: 159, 212). This view stems from the 
conviction that enmity (as a constructed 'other') builds trust among SC members thus stabilizing 
it by setting insiders apart from outsiders and reinforcing collective identity and internal 
cohesion (Koschut 2014: 547). On the contrary, we argue that because (illegal) immigration is 
an unmanageable trans-boundary phenomenon, immigration-related threat perceptions can 
destabilize SCs diverting member states from regional integration towards traditional power 
politics, rather than stimulating regional cooperation and solidarity against an emerging internal 
'threat'. In sum, the article examines the causal mechanism of the social construction of a 
security dilemma among SC member states that subverts central SC constitutive features, such 
as common identification and mutual trust as well as multilateral and integrationist dynamics.  
As to the second area of contribution, i.e. the literature on the Schengen regime, our 
explanation for the weakness of the regime, is based on a socio-psychological mechanism - 
which clearly constitutes a novelty in this area of research. Indeed, until now, the main 
explanations accounting for the weaknesses of the Schengen regime have been very similar to 
the criticism often voiced against the EU. First, the economic explanation contends that support 
for the EU (including Schengen) may have declined among the public and decision-makers 
following the realization that EU membership has accelerated the downturn in national 
economies (Abts, Heerweghy, et al., 2009, 2-3, 15; Lubbers and Scheeper 2010, 791; Quaglia 
2011, 45; Webber 2014, 345, 353-357). Another explanation draws on democratic deficit theory 
stressing the detrimental impact of growing de-legitimization of European institutions 
following undemocratic decision-making processes within the EU and related regimes 
(Abbarno and Zapryanova 2013, 584; Abts, Heerweghy et al., 2009: 17; Hix 2007, 140; 
Rohrschneider 2002, 472; Schmidt 2013, 2). Thirdly, the neorealist argument focuses on the 
Soviet Union's collapse in 1991, which fundamentally altered the European balance of power 
and removed the Europeans' incentive to integrate politically, militarily, and economically 
against an overwhelmingly powerful adversary, since then disappeared (Rosato 2011a: 10, 
2011b, 45-86).  
So the article contributes to the EU and Schengen crisis literature by proposing a new 
interpretation of member states' behaviour, which not only examines economic and political 
factors but also deep socio-psychological processes. It also highlights the impact of 
immigration-related fears and threat perceptions as a destabilizing variable in the internal 
dynamics of Schengen states, thereby continuing Cornelisse's research on the current Schengen 
crisis (2014). While she emphasizes the institutional and political tension between the abolition 
of internal border controls on the one hand and the member states’ willingness to retain 
considerable powers over immigration by third country nationals into their territories on the 
other,  our research further explains this inner tension by demonstrating the interplay between 
two contradictory security logics in the Schengen Area: the SC and the security dilemma 
associated with immigration-related threat perceptions. We believe that the socio-psychological 
component is a matter of great import, considering its capacity to shake and deeply implicate 
virtually all the members of the SC – compared to other crises which do not trigger such extreme 
reactions at such a wide scale (like the current economic sovereign debt crisis).  
  The article is structured as follows. First, the theoretical section explains the conceptual 
framework, especially the causal mechanism through which immigration-related threat 
perceptions downgrade SCs to the point of eroding well-established SC indicators. The 
empirical section then explores how this dynamic start to unfolds in the European SC, 
specifically regarding relations between Schengen members since 2007.3 These crucial years 
mark a period of rising tensions preceding the most recent significant crisis in July and August 
2015, which shook the entire migration regime. The analysis of the dynamics between 
Schengen members helps to clarify how immigration uncertainty and anxiety contribute to 
undermine experiments in security cooperation, eventually damaging established cooperative 
migration dynamics. Finally, the article describes the negative effect of this mechanism on 
different SC indicators while suggesting ways of surmounting these obstacles and proposing 
future research directions. 
Before proceeding, a short methodological section is in order. To substantiate our 
arguments about the destabilizing impact of the security dilemma mechanism on Schengen 
Members states4, we used both primary and secondary sources and applied different research 
methods: elite discourse analysis (including individual states' official state documents, 
parliamentary debates, decision makers' key speeches, formal documents, dispatches, and press 
releases of European institutions) and process tracing. Regarding the elite discourse analysis, 
we collected a massive amount of quotes of different policy makers in various formats 
(interviews, formal speeches etc) in order to establish the validity of our arguments about the 
evolvement of a security dilemma dynamic among SC member states as a result of immigration-
related threat perceptions. More specifically, we consider that we reached the point of 
‘theoretical saturation’ (Morse 2004) in terms of relevant articulations conveying a change of 
perceptions at the elite level vis-à-vis fellow Member States. We made sure to include quotes 
reflecting the ‘other voices’ in favour of Schengen, calling for the preservation of European 
solidarity and we-feeling – thereby not overlooking the alternative, though less dominant 
discourse, testament of the persisting SC logic. To establish the change in the nature of 
interactions between the states, we systematically process-traced practices related to member 
states’ migration policies, signalling a return to unilateral policies and a growing mistrust. We 
paid special attention to interactions between the traditional leading European states such as 
France and Germany and states bordering Schengen like Italy and Greece, which are more 
vulnerable to migration. We also examined 'peripheral' states like Denmark and the 
Netherlands, which displays varying levels and types of migration, to show that the dynamics 
under study are alive and widespread, and not just limited to a few European states.  
Theorizing the destabilizing impact of Immigration-Related Threat Perceptions on 
security communities 
SC characteristics  
Fascinated by the existence of 'communities' in an area torn by violence and power politics, the 
study of SCs developed extensively in the second half of the 20th century and is still flourishing. 
First introduced by Deutsch et al., in the late 1960s, the concept of SC refers to 'a group of 
people who have become integrated to the point where there is real assurance that the members 
of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some 
other way' (Deutsch in Adler 1997, 255). In the 1990s, Adler and Barnett redefined pluralistic 
SC stressing its identity component. They described such communities as 'socially constructed 
'cognitive regions' or 'community regions' whose people imagine that, with respect to their own 
security and economic well-being, borders run more or less, where shared understandings and 
common identities end' (Adler 1997, 255). In the past decade, two conceptual supplements were 
added to SC theory. While Pouliot (2008) developed a theory of SC practice arguing that peace 
exists in and through practice, Koschut (2014) added an emotional dimension to the study of 
SC.  
Besides distinguishing between SC development phases—nascent, ascendant, and 
mature—SC researchers have also identified SC indicators. Institutionalized multilateralism is 
one indicator of an emerging SC: member states are more likely to deal with common interests 
through joint mechanisms such as consensual decision-making procedures and structures which 
bring together high-level regional representatives who automatically incorporate the interests 
of all member states and are thus likely to be more consensual than other types of interstate 
relations (Adler and Barnett 1998, 55; Pouliot 2007, 608). Here some researchers add that SCs 
are characterized by expansion of transgovernmental networks, where civil servants in 
government departments and agencies, and military officers, work together in cooperative 
endeavours to implement SC policy (Bremberg 2015). Another indicator is unfortified borders. 
Although border checks and patrols persist, they are expected to secure states against non-
military threats (Adler and Barnett 1998, 55; Pouliot 2007, 608). A third indicator is changes 
in military planning. Such changes occur because members are no longer potential enemies in 
military scenarios (Adler and Barnett 1998, 56; Pouliot 2007, 608). Next, a common definition 
of threat and security is an important indicator of SC. Indeed, security is interdependent rather 
than mutually excluding and a threat to the community from an 'other' is agreed. Moving beyond 
these basic agreements, states reach an intersubjective understanding on how to deal with the 
agreed threat. SCs also share a community discourse and language. According to Adler and 
Barnett these can express members' strong identification with the SC and / or commonality of 
values and even the same emotional character as suggested by Koschut. They may also simply 
demonstrate a compatibility of values and mutual responsiveness towards the community's 
norms as opposed to values outside the community (Adler and Barnett 1998, 56; Bremberg 
2015, Koschut 2014; Pouliot 2007, 608). Tightly coupled SCs are also characterized by other 
indicators. First, they adopt policies of cooperative and collective security against urgent and 
exceptional measures (Adler and Barnett 1998, 56; Bremberg 2015). Second, they enjoy high 
levels of military integration by pooling military resources (Adler and Barnett 1998, 56). Third, 
member states have greater policy coordination and low-key and routine security practices (for 
example, 'patroling') against 'internal' threats (Adler and Barnett 1998, 57; Bremberg 2015). 
Fourth, tightly coupled SC's allow free movement of individuals between different member 
states, which are no longer seen as a potential threat (Adler and Barnett 1998, 57). Finally, 
mature SCs are characterized by shared coordinated public policies and systems of rule to the 
point of internalizing policies and law (Adler and Barnett 1998, 57).  
 Immigration-related threat perceptions as an explanatory variable 
We will now briefly present the main tenets of securitization theory, highlighting those 
elements most salient to our research, namely the social construction of migrants as a security 
threat in SC's focusing on national elites. It is indeed necessary to go at great length in 
explaining how the securitization of migrants unfolding within the different members of the 
SC, generates immigration-related threat perceptions that have in turn a detrimental impact on 
their relations. We basically show how a ‘securitized object’ has the potential to transcend 
national boundaries and affect the relations among the members of a SC.  
Though it is true that immigration-related threat perceptions may be prompted by rapid 
immigration-related demographic changes, which are in some way unlawful or illegitimate 
(RUDOLF 2006, 26), the question is whether these perceptions are really 'objective' or socially 
constructed as objective. The present research clearly supports the latter view by stressing that 
immigration-related threat perceptions are subject to social construction following powerful 
securitization processes. Securitization of migration involves extreme politicization and 
framing of migration as a security threat. This follows discursive activities or routinized 
practices such as surveillance and border controls (Balzacq 2010; Bigo 1994, 2000, 2008, 2009; 
Leonard 2010; Neal 2009), which foster the belief that immigrants represent an existential 
threat to the state and its citizens. This allows the securitizing actor to argue the need for 
emergency measures to deal with migrants and justifies actions outside normal political 
procedure (Buzan, Wæver et al., 1998, 25). An example is the framing of legal and illegal 
migrants5 as an existential threat to the host society justifying restrictive migration policies and 
the militarization of immigration-politics. Migration is generally socially constructed as a 
security threat to the whole socioeconomic and political spectrum: migrants are usually 
constructed as destabilizing internal security by correlating crime/terror with foreigners, as 
challenging both welfare provision and economic growth because they cheat the system, and 
by threatening majority identities and values at state and regional levels (Huysmans 2000).6  
While acknowledging that both the elite and public levels (Huysmans 2006, 46; Bigo 
2009, 586) fuel top-down and bottom-up securitization processes, we embrace the classical 
securitization theories’ emphasis on the political leader's role in determining and defining 
threats. Indeed, national political leaders, as powerful people and defenders of the national 
interests, are considered to be 'the accepted voice of security' (Buzan 1998, 31). While working 
closely with other securitizing actors, such as 'transnational security professionals' (Bigo 2002) 
who possess the know-how and status needed to generate legitimate security discourses (Bigo 
1994) – national elites remain the ultimate actor responsible for taking far-reaching decisions 
affecting SC cohesion. The study also argues that the social construction of migrants as a threat 
is so deeply entrenched in the social structure that it significantly affects the psyche of the state 
and its decision makers—contrasting with the dominant view that states and decision-makers 
use securitization processes instrumentally to increase power by legitimizing exceptional 
crackdowns against perceived security threat (Kariotis 2011). The political behaviour and social 
psychology literature offers compelling evidence that not only public opinion but also elites' 
attitudes regarding immigration are largely influenced by immigration-related threat 
perceptions (Lahav and Courtemanche 2012).  
What, then, is the impact of immigration-related securitization processes developing 
within a SC on the interactions between its members? In this article, we show how the 
securitization of migrants results in immigration-related threat perceptions, transcending the 
national borders of the SC and eventually translating in fears and suspicion among the SC 
member states. In other words, in SCs, immigration-related threat perceptions do not 
necessarily produce increased cooperative measures against the 'new threat' in an environment 
marked by new uncertainty, following the realization that immigration cannot be fully managed 
or blocked at the SC's borders. On the contrary, this new uncertainty can trigger a 
deconstruction of the SC collective identity, sabotage trust-relations among SC members and 
eventually lead to unilateral self-defence, namely a security dilemma dynamic. The following 
part describes how immigration-related threat perceptions can generate a security dilemma 
dynamic that destabilizes SCs.   
Social construction of a SC's security dilemma dynamic  
The traditional view7 of 'a security dilemma' argues that mutual suspicion and a chronic 
atmosphere of uncertainty, fear and anxiety embedded in the anarchical system invariably 
causes states, fearing for own security (See Booth and Wheeler 2008, 22-28; Jervis 1976, 64-
66),8 to act in self-defence9. The security dilemma is linked to two apparently inevitable 
predicaments in international politics: first, decision-makers in one state can never get fully into 
the minds of counterparts in other states and can never be certain of understanding their motives 
or intentions. Second, policy planners in one state can never fully predict when and how other 
states may deploy weapons (the so-called ‘inherent ambiguity of weapons’) (Booth and 
Wheeler 2008, 4). Security in general creates a vicious circle of mutual tension and unnecessary 
conflict (Booth and Wheeler 2008, 5).  
Whereas realists regard the security dilemma as a permanent feature in international 
politics, constructivists consider it a social construct of intersubjective understandings based on 
a social construction of conflictual identities, fear, and perceptions of competitive security. 
These factors undermine trust between states so much that they assume the worst of each other 
and start seeing self-help as an interest (Wendt 1995, 73; See also Alexseev 2006; Hopf 1998, 
188,190; Snyder and Jervis 1999). As for weapons, which are the material expression of the 
threat underpinning the security dilemma, they do not explain anything in themselves but they 
gain meaning and influence over human behaviour due to the power of common interpretations 
and understandings - in our context fear, mistrust, and defensive behaviour (Wendt 1995, 74).      
Although the security dilemma dynamic is difficult to change, especially because of its 
stability and the psychological security it gives to states (Mitzen 2006)10, constructivists 
disagree that the very nature of the security dilemma makes negative outcomes unavoidable. 
Wendt describes a social process, which can transform competitive security systems into 
cooperative systems where new intersubjective understandings are constructed, identities and 
practices are changed, and mutual trust can slowly develop (Booth and Wheeler 2008, 94; 
Hoffman 2002, 370; Hoffman 2006; Pouliot 2008, 278-9; Wendt 1992, 420-421). Barnett and 
Adler argue that eliminating feelings of threat and the use of force in cooperative security 
systems such as SCs, can allow other dilemmas and problems associated with collective goods 
to emerge while not triggering old psychological anxieties linked to classic security dilemmas 
(the new system has been inoculated against their resurgence) (Booth and Wheeler 2008, 188). 
Taking an opposite view, Booth and Wheeler highlight 'new uncertainties' in international 
relations that can cause 'new security dilemmas'.11 In what follows, this insight is taken a step 
further: using a constructivist prism, we consider how immigration introduces new uncertainties 
into SCs that can lead not only to collective goods' problems and disagreements, but also to a 
security dilemma between SC members, thereby profoundly destabilizing SCs.12 Our main 
argument is that a perceived migrant-related threat affects 'fundamental' areas of life and basic 
interests, causing significant fears, a loss of benchmarks, and deep uncertainties, thus 
destabilizing the basic trust on which the SC is built. In the new atmosphere of fear and 
uncertainty, SC members' responses to the security dilemma cease being considered predictable 
and are increasingly perceived as providing unreliable security measures against the 
immigration threat. This triggers a deconstruction of the SC members' collective identity, self-
defence practices by SC members—that eventually undermines mutual trust. We consider this 
process more systematically: 
Uncertainty and breakdown of consensus—In this first stage, the demographic, material factors 
and shared perceptions within elite circles, according to which immigrants threaten national 
and communal security, serve to heighten uncertainty and the feeling that other SC states are 
now unpredictable on the subject of immigration. This especially intensifies when immigration 
cannot be entirely managed or sealed at SC borders and becomes an 'internal' challenge. Taking 
Wendt's model of transformation from competitive to cooperative structures, we argue that the 
opposite is true: this stage signals the breakdown of the SC consensus regarding the ability or 
even willingness of its members to cooperate and reciprocate. The actual impotence of joint 
institutions also exacerbates uncertainties regarding states' intention and ability to supply 
collective goods (security and shared burden).  
Deconstruction of collective identity and reconstruction of Self-Other identities—In this stage, 
states critically examine old notions of Self and Other and the structures of interaction that 
maintained them. They question other states' intentions and abilities and imagine worst-case 
scenarios. They begin interpreting other members' behaviour as uncooperative and develop 
negative images of other states and their joint institutions. The key point is that the perceived 
unwillingness and inability of fellow member states and of joint institutions to effectively 
control community borders in a borderless community, is not only suspected, but also assumed 
and anticipated.  
Changes in practices- As uncertainties rise regarding other states' intentions and capabilities, 
and acute immigration fears and negative images about other members and common institutions 
grow, some members decide they would rather not take risks. Instead, they turn to 
transformative self-defence practices; we qualify these as transformative because they run 
counter to the SC's long-standing normative practices. There are two types of transformative 
practices: unilateral reinstatement of internal borders (defensive self-help) and issuing temporal 
visas unilaterally, which other members may consider offensive since immigrants are not only 
constructed as threats but as weapons as well.  
Violation of trust- When one or more SC states take defensive steps trust is broken. When states 
that do preserve the status quo lose confidence and question their previous positive expectations 
(based on shared norms and emotions and trust in the stability of the other states' identities), the 
result is a negative view of the situation and emotional distress generating 'negative emotions' 
(anger, stigmatization, etc.) (Koschut 2014, 537-538).13 Whereas Koschut (2014, 537-538) 
believes that negative emotions can help rid the SC of sources of discord and often signal 
emotional attachment to the SC, we argue that negative emotions generated by the recurrent 
violation of communal norms like multilateralism and free movement, can signal a shift in 
members' mutual perceptions from 'colleague' to 'enemy' or at least to an 'other'. Instead of 
stabilizing the SC, 'negative emotions' can create new divisions and profound mistrust.    
Security paradox- Violation of trust and ensuing low levels of trust between certain SC 
members causes others to respond with similar defensive measures, producing further layers of 
mistrust in a vicious circle. 
Evaluating the impact of this process on the SC 
This section articulates our last theoretical claim that immigrant-related threat perceptions 
destabilize SCs through the above mechanisms, namely the social construction of the security 
dilemma by the SC states. We assess this claim by examining new weaknesses that have 
emerged in several well-established SC indicators:  
Multilateralism- When immigration-related threat perceptions produce a security dilemma 
dynamic that weakens SC members' basic trust it may prompt states to defect from cooperative 
norms and adopt unilateral defensive practices. This includes unilateral steps to restore border 
controls and reject integration / issue-specific membership. 
Unfortified borders- We suggest that re-establishing borders and introducing 'smart technology' 
in response to immigration-related uncertainty regarding other SC states' intentions may lead 
fortification resembling that against military invasion.      
Joint definition and perception of security and threat. Although most SC states have 
immigration-related threat perceptions, the activation of the security dilemma sabotages the 
possibility of a common understanding of security and threat. This can even prompt the 
construction of a perceived threat from SC members that are unwilling or incapable of 
controlling their borders and shouldering the common burden.  
Discourses and language of community expressing a we-feeling- In the context of the 
immigration-related security dilemma we argue that problems with understanding other states' 
intentions and abilities cause some SC members to view fellow states and joint institutions 
negatively. This arouses scepticism regarding the regional community's discourse. 
Cooperative and collective security- We suggest that immigration-related fears and 
uncertainties weaken cooperative security mechanisms by allowing immediate self-defensive 
actions by individual states. This includes resurrecting borders under special circumstances or 
excluding members that fail to meet their commitments from the community. Following 
security fears, the increased likelihood of states defecting and states' readiness to resort to worse 
(offensive) measures (e.g., unilateral temporal visa requirement) which bypass cooperative 
institutions, can further weaken cooperative security mechanisms. 
Weaker policy coordination against 'internal' threats- Although there may be increased 
institutionalized cooperation among SC members aimed at tackling immigration, which is seen 
as a threat, the fear that other member states cannot or will not confront immigration might 
increase national controls away from the borders. 
Free movement of populations within the SC- Here we argue that the freedom of cross border 
mobility, which is a key principle in a tightly coupled security community, is undermined by a 
desire to secure borders prompted by the atmosphere of immigration-related uncertainty and 
mistrust towards fellow SC members.  
Internationalization of authority and rule (supranationalism)- Weak supranationalism is 
especially apparent in the context of migration controls. In a security-dilemma environment, 
supranationalism is weakened when member states considered unable or unwilling to tackle the 
common threats become increasingly considered security threats.  
Schengen Area put to the test: Impact of Immigration Related-Threat Perceptions on 
SCs 
This section reflects on the theoretical arguments developed above and unfolds as follows: first, 
we present a short history of the Schengen Area and characterise it as a SC. Then, we establish 
the robustness of our explanatory variable, namely the intensification of immigration-related 
threat perceptions in the European SC at the elite level. Finally, we examine the immigration-
related threat perceptions' impact on the social construction of the security dilemma dynamic, 
as exemplified in recent relations among member states.  
Schengen Area as a Security Community 
The Schengen Agreement was signed in 1985 as a parallel European initiative to the European 
Union. It eliminated internal border controls and deepened the Common Market (Cornelisse 
2014, 744-745, 777-778; Zaioti 2011, 2, 69). In the late 1990s, the Schengen regime was 
incorporated into the EU (Cornelisse 2014, 747-748). Nowadays, it includes all EU members-
with the notable exceptions of Great Britain and Ireland, plus non-EU countries such as 
Norway, Iceland, and Switzerland (Zaiotti 2011, 5).  
The Schengen Area is a tightly coupled SC. There are several indicators supporting this 
claim. First, it is largely considered a common 'imagined community' with a collective identity. 
As Zaiotti noted, 'It became the symbol of a sui generis entity…. a normative environment 
functioning as a socializing arena and point of reference around which new ideas are anchored' 
(Zaiotti 2011, 6, 10, 54, 81).  Second, the Schengen regime sought to create a common space 
where not only goods and capitals but also individuals could circulate freely (Zaiotti 2011, 2). 
More specifically, the Schengen Borders Code (SBC) prohibits internal border checks and 
permits the temporal reinstatement of such checks only under exceptional circumstances 
(Cornelisse 2014, 750). Third, as a 'European Space' it is characterized by 'post-national' 
political, economic, and military integration (Bremberg 2015). Fourth, the Schengen states also 
transcend a close meaning of 'security' by reconceptualising national security as no longer a 
matter of territorial defence but one of collective threats and risks (Bremberg 2015). Since its 
inception, the regime also sought to move border controls to the external perimeter of the 
Schengen area while establishing other more diffuse forms of control within and beyond the 
regime (Zaiotti 2011, 2, 72). Fifth, Schengen members developed common 'policies of 
protection’ and mechanisms of coordination14 within the area of justice and home affairs (JHA), 
including counter-terrorism, police and judicial cooperation, border, asylum and migration 
management, and civil protection, to deal with common threats (Bremberg 2015). Sixth, 
transgovernmental networks and agencies and other coordination mechanisms play a prominent 
role in ‘internal’ security (FRONTEX, Eurosur and Schengen Information System (I, II)) 
(Bremberg 2015; Cornelisse 2014, 750; Zaiotti 2011, 163). Seventh, as Zaiotti shows, border 
control has become a matter of multilateral negotiation where key decisions are taken by 
regional institutions composed of both intergovernmental and supranational actors (Schengen 
Executive Committee, Council of the European Union, European Commission) (Zaiotti 2011, 
3). Furthermore, the Schengen Area redistributes policy implementation responsibilities among 
national governments- corresponding to 'intensive transgovernmentalism' (Zaiotti 2011, 4). 
Finally, these collective arrangements, indicating the partial renouncement of a key statist 
function, arguably require a significant amount of trust among Schengen members—one of the 
main constitutive features of the Schengen Area as a SC.   
Immigration-related threat perceptions among Schengen Area states 
In the past twenty years, the Schengen Area has witnessed widespread immigration-related 
fears and threat perceptions. This sub-section presents evidence that many Schengen states 
show symptoms of growing anti-immigrant attitudes and immigration-related threat 
perceptions at the national elite level- alongside attempts to oppose this trend. We assume that 
immigration-related threat perceptions are largely due to a complex social construction of 
meaning, i.e. securitization processes. We do not present here an in-depth analysis of migration-
linked securitization measures but use existing literature to support our argument. Indeed, 
previous studies, demonstrate a growing immigration-related threat perception at the elite level 
in Schengen member states. Particularly telling is that migration, as a multi-dimensional 
security threat has gained in importance since the 1990s, and even more so following 9/11, in 
Western European domestic and regional elite discourse (Buonfino 2004; Huysmans 2000, 
2006; Karyotis 201115; Matonytė and Morkevičius 2009, 101;Tsoukala 2005, 163).  
Relevant articles show the cross-European extent of this phenomenon and the similarity 
of its discursive components in parliamentary debates in Western Europe (UK, France, 
Germany, Spain, Netherlands) (Van Dijk 1993). Elites’ discourse has traditionally stressed the 
adverse impact of immigration on jobs, public order, cultural norms, and national social 
harmony, often suggesting a threat to the host society's interests, values, and lifestyle (Simon 
and Alexander 1993). Such argumentation regularly appears in the official discourse of many 
European countries—Switzerland (Riano, and Wastl-Walter 2006), Greece (Karyotis and 
Patrikios 2010; Tsoukala, 2005), Italy (Tsoukala 2005), Malta (Pace 2013), Germany and 
Austria (Howard 2000), France (Van der Valk 2003) as well as Central and Eastern European 
countries16 – albeit not with the same intensity as significant political differences persist 
regarding the migration debate.  
Indeed, this trend has been counter-balanced by non-negligible de-securitization moves 
in certain European countries (for example, in Germany during the 2015 refugee crisis), 
political parties as well as in EU institutions (Alkopher, 2015). Yet, as Zaiotti and Cornelisse 
rightly argue, immigration-related threat perceptions are specifically inherent to Schengen, 
which 'has become over the years a security-centred and security-driven initiative' (Zaioti 2011, 
17; see also Cornelisse 2014, 748). Immigration has mainly been conceived as an external 
challenge, surmountable by creating 'Fortress Europe' that is, by strengthening Schengen's 
external borders. The question occupying decision makers has thus been the management of 
collective action issues (See Webber 2015, 345; Cornelisse 2014). The following part shows 
that since 2007, through 2011 and even more so after 2015, increased illegal immigration to 
Europe has proven 'Fortress Europe' to be unsealed. The shift in perception of the immigration-
related threat from an 'external' threat to an 'internal' one has produced new uncertainties. Let 
us now explore how these powerful uncertainties have (the potential to trigger Schengen's 
mutual security dilemma dynamics.   
The social construction of the security dilemma among Schengen Member States 
To demonstrate the first seeds of the social construction of the security dilemma dynamic, this 
sub-section provides empirical evidence of four critical events in Schengen's recent history: the 
2007 Enlargement17; the Schengen Agreement revision following the diplomatic row between 
France and Italy in 2011 triggered by waves of North African migrants, the most recent 
enlargement involving Romania and Bulgaria, and finally, the recent refugee crisis of the 
summer of 2015. These events illustrate the multistage transformation in Schengen member 
states' relations caused by immigration-related threat perceptions: from a decrease in shared 
understandings, mutual reliance, and cooperative security, towards more suspicion, 
defensiveness, and competitive security. Because of its complexity, the transformation is not 
linear. The security dilemma is a spiral dynamic whose stages are not chronological although 
they undoubtedly fuel one another. A note of caution is necessary here: we do not argue that 
Schengen member states have become fully-fledged enemies along dichotomous lines; we 
rather emphasize the regression in the mutual understanding and common practices shared until 
then by Schengen member states – a phenomenon which remains completely reversible.  
Stage I — Uncertainty and consensus breakdown. First we argue that immigration-related threat 
perceptions are currently fairly strong in Schengen zone relations that benchmarks have been 
lost and an atmosphere of deep uncertainty and anxiety has emerged. An uncertain environment 
pervades following ambient fears due to an acute sense of threat and the institutional ambiguity 
of the EU's migration policy (Kostakopoulou 2000, 500).18 One outstanding feature of this first 
stage is the security consensus breakdown. The Schengen states are facing a novel and difficult 
phenomenon, and the elites' discourse shows that decision makers are beginning to question 
cooperative collective norms. Basically, they are wondering if the norms of the past twenty 
years can still tackle the new migration challenges. German Justice Minister Hans-Peter 
Friedrich expressed in 2012 concern about increasing numbers of Middle East migrants 
entering the EU from Greece, 'the question still remains what happens when a country is not 
capable of securing its borders'.19 In an 2011 speech on the future accession of Bulgaria and 
Romania, Nicolas Sarkozy similarly wondered, 'If a failing state controls other countries' 
borders, what do we do?'20 These statements clearly show that Schengen members' feel 
unprecedented concern that the SC is not and cannot be sealed, thus transforming 'immigration' 
(illegal immigration especially) from an 'external' to an 'internal' perceived threat. This is also 
breaking down the consensus over the ability and reliability of supranational institutions to 
deliver collective goods, particularly immigration-related security. In his 2012 Villepinte 
speech, Sarkozy again spoke stingingly, 'France does not intend to leave the management of 
migration flows in the sole hands of technocrats and tribunals'.21 Finally, the recent 2015 
refugee crisis abounds with declarations by key politicians reflecting the uncertainty and 
confusion as to the expected behavior of fellow Schengen member states and the EU's ability 
to handle this new situation. While there are voices coming from Eastern Europe from the 
Czech Republic, Poland and especially Hungary, emphasizing the ‘national interests’ to protect 
citizens' security vis-à-vis the flow of immigrants- as articulated here by the Hungarian 
government spokesman: ‘The boat is full…we all wish for a European solution, but we need to 
protect Hungarian interests and our population’22- others, such as France and Germany wish to 
find a multilateral solution to the crisis.23 Yet even when a tentative European solution is put 
on the table, there is no consensus neither regarding the desirability of the formula proposed 
nor on the EU’s capacity to deliver. In fact, Eastern European countries did not agree to the 
proposal of permanent compulsory quotas for the relocation of refugees across the Schengen 
area– that they considered as dictations.24 
Stage II — Deconstruction of collective identity and reconstruction of Self-Other identities 
Bewilderment and helplessness is replaced by certainty that other Schengen members can no 
longer be relied upon, at least not for immigration-related security. Our research shows that 
these fears, suspicions, and doubts are being internalized. Old ideas about collective identity 
have been supplanted by new ideas. These old ideas included assumptions about other members' 
willingness to cooperate and the dependability of other members and structures of interaction, 
such as multilateral and cooperative mechanisms. Negative images of fellow states and EU 
institutions have emerged and accusations ranging from weakness, unreliability, and betrayal, 
to irresponsibility and inefficiency have multiplied. 
Various states have issued such reproaches. The Northern European countries and other 
core European states like France and Germany have traditionally accused their southern 
counterparts of irresponsible border management. Dutch Immigration Minister Gerd Leers 
justified his opposition to Romanian and Bulgarian accession in these terms, 'Imagine you have 
a door with eight of the best locks in the world. But before that door is standing someone who 
lets everybody in, then you have a problem'.25 The Schengen states' discourse not only accuses 
their counterparts of inability to keep the borders shut but also of reluctance to do so—thus 
shifting responsibility for halting the migrant waves to others. The diplomatic row in spring 
2011 illustrates this perfectly: France accused Italy of recklessly shunting immigrants across its 
borders without formalizing their status.26 Displaying similar anger, Germany, Austria, and 
Belgium directly accused Rome of 'cheating' on the Schengen rulebook.27 In response, the 
Southern Mediterranean countries raised the delicate issue of 'burden-sharing' and 'lack of 
solidarity', accusing their northern counterparts of abandoning them to struggle with 
unprecedented migratory pressure. Unsurprisingly, the conviction that certain states might 
respond unpredictably to the threat of migration causes others to anticipate uncooperative 
behaviour, while the difficulty of knowing other states' intentions and abilities fosters worst-
case thinking and 'anticipation of harm'. These articulations multiplied during the 2015 recent 
refugee crisis: This time, the Northern European states, such as Germany, voiced their concern 
of being left alone to manage refugee flows, due to Central and Eastern European states' refusal 
to accept the new common plan of refugee quotas28- a maneuver described (together with 
building fences) by French Foreign Minister, Laurent Fabius, as 'going against the values of the 
European Union…'29 signaling a possible reconstruction of East and Central European states as 
'others'. 
Stage III — Changes in practices. The theoretical section describes how the second stage of the 
reactivation of security dilemmas in SCs leads to the third stage. Convinced that they are 
operating in an uncertain environment with unreliable co-members, member states conclude 
they have to be self-reliant and adopt transformative practices of self-defence. Our analysis 
shows that when collective self-perceptions change, Schengen states adopt various defensive 
practices:  
 Unilateral resurrection of borders within Schengen.  
First, the 1990 Schengen Implementing Agreement (SIA) allows the unilateral resurrection of 
borders within the Security Community—but only under certain conditions of an exceptional 
nature (Groenendjik 2004, 160). Indeed, Article 2(2) of the SIA allows member states to 
reinstate checks only if public policy or national security requires and only for a limited 
period.30 In the past twenty years, Article 2(2) has mainly been applied before sporting or 
political events when anticipating large-scale internal disorder. More interestingly, however, 
we also find cases where the clear aim was to restrict immigration of third country nationals 
(Groenendjik 2004, 160). During the period in question, 2007-2015, we find several examples 
of a migration threat followed by reintroduction of internal Schengen Area borders checks. In 
April 2011, France re-established border controls to curb North African migrants from entering 
the country from Italy. Similarly, in March 2012, Germany, France, the UK, Austria, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, and Sweden issued a common letter threatening to reinstate 'emergency 
internal border controls' if Greece did not improve its border security with Turkey,31 and 
Sweden demanded a reintroduction of border controls equivalent to 'permanent' controls.32 The 
recent refugee crisis in Europe magnified this dynamic, with Hungary and Slovenia erecting 
borders along the exterior Schengen border, quickly followed by Austria, Germany,33 Denmark, 
and the Netherlands. This time these countries re-imposed controls and a military presence 
along their borders with other member states, acknowledging that they could scarcely cope with 
thousands of asylum seekers arriving each day to their territory.34 
 Alternative security controls 
To bypass Schengen Area restrictions on resurrecting internal borders, some states have 
developed alternative unilateral security controls to side step restrictions. These involve indirect 
and discrete measures including smart technologies and frequent national border patrols, 
indicating some states' desire to retain some control over their borders due to doubts over other 
states' abilities to curb immigration threats and their intentions towards migration. These 
policing measures have been emplaced to monitor the people's movement to and from member 
states as a form of compensatory security control.35 This defensive practice particularly 
increased after the 2007 Schengen Enlargement. At this time, the Czech authorities complained 
to Austria and Germany regarding invalid controls on Czech citizens.36 The recent refugee crisis 
amplified this dynamic, as exemplified by the Swedish government's temporary introduction of 
identity checks for all travelers wanting to cross the Oresund Bridge.37 This rationale indicates 
a strong lack of trust in member states and a desire to protect themselves, being driven by worst-
case scenario predictions and the anticipated poor performance from others. 
 Exclusion and suspension of Schengen Area membership 
States can defend themselves by excluding fellow Schengen states if the latter are ineffective 
in their commitments. This clause, which permits temporary suspension of a state’s 
membership, was introduced after 2011 as part of the revised Schengen Agreement. It 
established a direct linkage between the unsatisfactory application of the Schengen acquis by 
one member state and the suspension of freedom of movement for nationals of that state and 
third country nationals holding similar EU rights.38 Following the 2015 refugee crisis, EU 
ministers actually discussed the suspension of Greece and potentially more member states.39  
States suspicious can also try to prevent others from 'harming' them by opposing new 
states' accession into the community.40 This unambiguous act of rejection not only shows that 
states doubt the capacities/intentions of new candidates to protect the SC's external borders; but 
it can also be interpreted as a lack of trust in EU institutions, such as the European Parliament, 
which recommends accepting countries.41 Reluctance to accept new members was particularly 
striking in the cases of Bulgaria and Romania (Ciobanu 2013).42 Although the justification for 
the delay in their acceptance is couched in legal jargon, the real reason has been a fear that a 
'high level of corruption, and the widespread presence of organized crime will affect the 
countries’ capacity to effectively manage Europe’s borders', allowing illegal waves of migrants 
to cross Europe (Zaiotti 2013).43  
Last but not least, a member state can decide unilaterally to protect itself by threatening 
to suspend its participation in the regime, thus violating the norms of cooperative behavior and 
introducing a new practice of self-defence. Nicolas Sarkozy did just this in his 2012 presidential 
campaign, when he warned that France would pull out of Schengen unless the EU toughened 
its immigration policy.44 Similarly, following the refugee crisis in 2015, the Swedish 
government secured a temporary exemption from the European Union's open-border Schengen 
agreement, in order to impose border controls.45  
 Shuffling migrants from one territory to another (urging them to go) 
States implicitly encourage migrants to travel across Europe and leave their specific territory 
by unilaterally issuing temporal visas to immigrants. Besides the case of Italy and France in 
2011, a similar scenario unfolded in May 2013, when Germany literally accused Italy of 
sending African migrants to Northern Europe. The Italian authorities tacitly acknowledged 
giving them money for this purpose.46 A more extreme example was seen only recently when 
the Greek Defence Minister, Panos Kammenos, threatened to 'flood Europe with migrants', if 
Europe failed to find a solution to the Greek debt crisis.47 In the same vein, during the July 2015 
refugee crisis, Hungary followed in the footsteps of its southern neighbors- Greece and Italy – 
that routinely avoid registering and fingerprinting some of the refugees and illegal migrants 
arriving, allowing them to head north unchecked, even before German's suspension of the 
Dublin prerogatives.48  Denmark then imitated Hungary and allowed refugees to move freely 
through its territory to Sweden.49  
Stage IV — Loss of trust. The adoption of the above defensive practices signals member states 
that they can no longer depend on each other regarding these issues. When the confidence once 
based on common norms and identity perceptions is lost, a profound breakdown in trust occurs 
among SC members.  
Particularly powerful in this regard are statements by European officials clearly 
expressing their disappointment and loss of trust in their fellow Schengen member due to the 
confusion over these transformative practices. Ahead of the 2007 Schengen Enlargement, some 
candidate countries suspected that certain members wished to delay their accession not on 
technical grounds but for political concerns. The Hungarian Foreign minister stated, 'We 
(Hungary) will be prepared by the given deadline with all preparation for joining the Schengen 
zone. And we also mention that it goes beyond a question of informatics... it is much more a 
political question... much more a confidence question' [emphasis added].50  
The same accusations and resentment resurfaced in Bulgaria and Romania's bid for 
accession to Schengen. Although the European Commission found the two countries 
technically ready for Schengen membership in 2010 their accession was deferred by key EU 
member states. The reasons cited ranged from poor border control, corruption, lack of progress 
under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM), to the threat of 'benefit tourism' 
from the countries’ Roma population.51  
Similarly, deep disappointment was increasingly expressed during the 2011 refugee crisis 
that resulted in the Schengen Agreement's revision. The so-called 'violation of the Spirit of 
Schengen' became a recurring motto and signalled that the prevailing earlier cooperative 
practices and solidarity had been seriously harmed. The EU's response was a fierce defence of 
Schengen, a project that was portrayed as emblematic for what Europe stood for (Cornelisse 
2014, 759). Alluding to the crisis then developing among Schengen members, European 
Commissioner, Cecilia Malmström said, 'it was clear that the trust which is essential to the 
sustainability of the system had been severely tested'.52 Trust relations were further damaged 
during the July 2015 refugee crisis, as exemplified by the tense relations between Sweden and 
Denmark. Swedish Prime Minister, Stefan Lofven, said in response to Denmark's decision to 
freely allow refugees to move through its territory to other Scandinavian countries, that EU 
rules under which refugees should be registered in the country where they first arrive must be 
upheld and that the decision to send refugees on to Sweden was 'unfortunate'.53 
Stage V — Chain reaction and the Security Dilemma Paradox. As we saw in the theoretical 
section, when SC members lose significant mutual trust they response as expected, anticipating 
harm and reacting defensively to other members' behaviour. The resulting spiral of mistrust 
have the potential to create a security dilemma paradox as the following empirical examples 
show.  
In spring 2011, this domino effect was evident when states responded to each others' 
decisions by re-establishing a degree of control over migratory movements across their borders. 
As Cecilia Malmström stressed in a speech, 'Shortly thereafter [Authors: the steps taken by Italy 
and France], steps were taken by the Danish government to intensify what were claimed to be 
'customs controls' at their land borders with Germany and Sweden. Again, while those plans 
have now thankfully been shelved, the development undoubtedly placed further strain on the 
mutual trust and political credibility of the Schengen system'.54  However, as it transpired, the 
chain reaction did not end there: after Denmark's move to impose border checks, it was the 
Netherlands' turn to push forward a border control project55, to 'check the registration of certain 
vehicles with a view to curtailing illegal immigration and illegal residence in the Netherlands.'56 
This dynamics further escalated in summer 2015: many states replicated to Hungary’s unilateral 
practices by imitating them. This domino effect led to the re-imposition of border controls to 
prevent immigrants from coming in and the shuffling of refugees to other member countries in 
violation of the Dublin regulations.  
Conclusions 
Immigration-related threat perceptions have generated a series of security dilemma dynamics, 
which destabilize the Schengen Area as a SC. Even though cooperative counter-moves are also 
taking place, the security-dilemma logic prevails and succeeds in challenging the Schengen 
project. To make substantiate this argument, we look at several recognized indicators of a SC.  
Broadly speaking, the outcomes of the security dilemma mechanism correspond to a 
growing tendency among Schengen Member States to reject cooperative norms of 
multilateralism in favour of unilateral defensive practices. There is no gainsaying that there 
have also been repeated attempts at arriving to common European solutions embedded in a 
discourse supporting a multilateral approach to immigration issues, even at the height of the 
refugee crisis in summer 2015. These have first and foremost been put forward by the European 
Commission- the so-called ‘guardian of the EU project’- but also by individual member states 
such as Germany and France. For example, Jean Asselborn, Luxembourg's Foreign minister, 
recently called for a 'Europeanisation of the asylum process' and suggested that the European 
Asylum Support Office (EASO) in Malta should be expanded into a European authority for 
refugees.57 Yet this study offers ample empirical evidence of the importance and heavy 
consequences that unilateral defensive practices do have on the robustness of the SC. The 
proliferation of these unilateral defensive practices highlights a lesser degree of multilateralism 
than expected from a mature, tightly coupled SC. The cooperative and collective security 
indicator has also been weakened by unilateral defensive practices. Not only have security 
practices become increasingly independent in various states, but states may also deliberately 
try to exclude weaker SC members from the Schengen Area, like Greece. This does not imply 
that collective security measures have stopped to exist. On the contrary, there are multiple 
examples of multilateral joint operations: in the framework of Operation Triton, thousands of 
immigrants were rescued at sea thanks to the cooperation between the Italian Coast Guard and 
navy, Frontex as well as vessels from Ireland and Norway. Moreover, a new project is being 
launched- EUNAVFOR MED- whose aim is to 'dispose' vessels used for human trafficking in 
the Mediterranean.58 Yet, despite these cooperative initiatives, once (illegal) immigration 
becomes an 'internal' issue, the security perceptions of member states change and acute narrow 
national security perceptions come to the fore, as expressed by the Hungarian Prime Minister 
for whom the refugee problem is a German problem and national security measures have to 
take precedence.59 
Regarding the SC indicator policy coordination against internal threats, the empirical 
section showed that despite considerable cooperation of a general nature (including recent 
military and civilian illegal immigration-related humanitarian crisis management and collective 
borders patrols in the framework of FRONTEX), states have not stopped installing more 
discrete controls away from their borders, like the checks on the Czech-Austrian border. 
Furthermore, the fact that internal border control has been reinforced with smart technologies, 
and above all soldiers60, points to negative changes in the unfortified borders indicator. In fact, 
the mobilization of military actors against the possibility that other states might allow migrants 
across the border is most significant and reminds the type of fortification used against organized 
military threats. Borders once considered collectively 'internal' are now increasingly seen as 
nationally 'external' and inherently risky. It looks as if migrants were constructed and perceived 
as a kind of weapon that SC members use against each other. Another key indicator of a 
previously tightly coupled and now weakened SC concerns the free movement of people within 
the SC: the increase in actual internal border checks, as well as the intention of Schengen 
Member States to do so, is a case in point. During the recent refugee crisis, a growing number 
of discursive warnings have been expressed by key politicians such as Nicholas Sarkozy, 
Thereza Mai, the British Interior Minister, and Thomas de Maiziere, Germany's Interior 
minister, casting serious doubts over the viability of the free movement regime.61 There are also 
signs of erosion in another indicator: the common definition and perception of security and 
threat, which take the form of recurring expressions of mistrust, disappointment, and 
accusations of other states of weakness. Thus, although immigration-threat related perceptions 
are widely shared by the Schengen members, the mutual fears and uncertainties that have 
developed, have significantly compromised their common understanding and exacerbated 
individual fears. The discourse expressing a we-feeling also seems less appropriate because of 
the security dilemma dynamic. It is indeed rare to find any expression of the former we-feeling 
amongst all the harsh rhetoric used by member states when discussing migration management 
and border control. As the theoretical section notes, expressing 'negative emotions' does not 
necessarily imply destabilization of the SC and the analysis of the 'emotive' rhetoric affirms this 
argumentation regarding the European Commission. However, the Schengen states' emotive 
reactions show a shift in their mutual perceptions—from 'colleague' to 'enemy', or at least to a 
source of threat. As accurately put by the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude 
Juncker, in 'the State of the Union' speech in September 2015 right at the midst of the refugee 
crisis: 'There is not enough Europe in this Union. And there is not enough Union in this Union'.62 
  Last but not least, the internationalization of authority and rule indicator also shows 
signs of weakening due to immigration-related threat perceptions and the mechanism they 
trigger. Indeed, the Commission keeps pushing for common immigration and refugee policy 
even in times of crisis. In September 2015, it even suggested a revolutionary permanent 
relocation mechanism that would allow dealing with future refugee crisis situations more 
swiftly. Yet, in the period following the Franco-Italian border dispute, as well as during the 
refugee crisis in 2015, European institutions allowed states considerable national latitude over 
migration and border control (Cornelisse 2014, 766-767). It is also not sure whether the 
Commission's new refugee plan will be successful. After all, some member states (i.e., 
the ‘Visegrad Four’ countries – the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland) soundly 
rejected mandatory refugee quotas.63 
In sum, this study demonstrates that at the level of European political elites, 
immigration-related threat perceptions are not without consequence on the SC's robustness: the 
security dilemma dynamics prompted by immigration-related threat perceptions have 
definitively destabilized the Schengen Area. At this juncture, sceptics may be asking why these 
mechanisms do not eventually lead to the collapse of the SC as a whole. It is our contention 
that this question is mainly an empirical one: only empirical developments will tell if these 
dynamics have the potential not only to weaken but also to completely dismantle the SC. In this 
extreme case, we expect other factors– beyond the immigration-related threat perception that 
was at the heart of this study- such as economic and domestic political factors to play a crucial 
role in such a destructive process. A possible explanation for the persistence of the SC though, 
might be the political and institutional counter-moves belonging to the deep-seated security 
dynamics proper to the SC. These counter-reactions are interesting to investigate in their own 
rights but this goes beyond the scope of this study. Here we rather aimed at showing that the 
recent developments shaking the Schengen Area, cannot be regarded as mere migration 
management and border control disagreements eroding Schengen's cooperative dynamics. 
Instead, they denote complex social processes involving changing identities, norms, practices 
and trust relations that have the potential to severely damage the interactions among the 
Member States of the Schengen Area and possibly beyond. The question of whether or not these 
dynamics have the potential to affect other European regimes of cooperation and possibly the 
EU as a whole is left to be examined in future research.  
Finally, several avenues for further research are suggested. A first possibility could be 
to investigate how SCs could surmount an immigration-related crisis of the type described 
above. Indeed, as the constructivist nature of the security dilemma suggests, the negative 
dynamics related to immigration-related threat perceptions, are by no means irreversible. Hence 
we suggest two mechanisms with the potential to reverse these detrimental processes. The first 
mechanism could build on existing SC literature addressing the rehabilitation of collective 
identities and trust among an SC's members in times of crisis, either by way of re-building a 
sense of common unifying purpose (i.e humanitarian aid for refugees)  (á la Kitchen 2009), 
through verbal fighting (á la Bially-Matern 2005) in order to persuade deserting member states 
into past ‘common practices’ (i.e., the re-enforcement of the Dublin convention) or through the 
reshaping of common institutional practices in face of the new immigration-related uncertainty, 
in a manner that would make member states behavior more ‘expected’ (á la Pouliot 2011) (i.e., 
common refugees quotas). The second mechanism relates, to our view, to the root causes of the 
crisis, namely the immigration-related threat perceptions within SC, and draws on the existing 
de-securitization literature. De-securitization strategies generally emanate from the public and 
NGO's level, but can also be initiated by SC elites.64 In any case, the purpose of such strategies 
is to prevent immigrants from being framed in terms of security. From this perspective, research 
would explore processes of immigration-related de-securitization within the SC that could 
reduce the state of uncertainty caused by immigration-related threat perceptions as well as 
related fears, thereby eliminating the motivation for suspicion towards other member states.  
Last but not least, another promising direction for further research would explore the 
extent to which the above insights resonate with other cases of SCs. We have chosen to illustrate 
our theoretical insights by focusing on the specific case of the Schengen regime. This, by no 
means, indicates that these insights cannot be applied and developed further in order to learn 
more about the impact of immigration related security perceptions on other types of (Security) 
Communities. After all, the mechanism for activating a security dilemma dynamic in an SC is 
arguably not just limited to Europe (as is the development of an SC) and it would be interesting 
to explore whether it is possible to draw any parallels between the European experience and 
US-Canadian relations for instance. An important inquiry in this regard deals with the possible 
difference in the impact of immigration-related threat perceptions on different degrees of SCs, 
for example, 'pluralistic' vs. 'tightly coupled' SCs. In this respect, one question worth exploring 
is whether the impact on less developed SCs (without common borders or common immigration 
policy) would be less devastating and dramatic than the impact on mature SCs.   
Notes 
 
1 We therefore accept the less traditional thinking and study of SC's of Bremberg (2015: 678) 
according to which SC is not only about 'hard security,' but also involves low-key and routine-
based security practices towards non-military perceived threats.  Moreover, according to 
Bremberg, the absence of preparations for armed conflict- as a proxy for dependable 
expectations of peaceful change-might not be the only, or even the best, means of identifying 
security communities. Rather, those can be indicated by 'inter-state relations that are organized 
in overlapping and concentric circles'.    
2 Mueler H (2006) A Theory of Decay of Security Communities with an Application to the 
Present State of the Atlantic Alliance. Working Paper for the Institute of European Studies. 
Paper no. 060409, pp.1-38, available at https://escholarship.org/uc/item/95n4b4sp (16 June 
2015).  
3 We chose 2007 as our starting point as it both marks the climax of the Schengen regime in 
terms of integration and the onset of a period characterized by economic downturn, the rise of 
populist parties and more restrictive national policies.  
4 We fully realize that transnational entities and security practitioners play a significant role in 
the construction of Schengen and its maintenance.  However, we focus here on member states 
as our analysis revolves around the concept of security communities, whose main components 
are states. We also agree with Zaiotti that Schengen is still an elite-centred, top-down regime 
influenced by those in high political levels and key nationals decision-makers (Zaiotti 2011, 
17).  
5 The authors are fully aware of the legal distinction made between legitimate/regular migrants 
and illegitimate/ irregular or undocumented migrants at the national and European levels. Yet 
in practice, these boundaries are flexible (as in the case of legal migrants turning into illegal 
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